A recent development in formal security protocol analysis is the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL), proposed in [DDMP05, Dat05, Der06, DDMR07]. We identify a number of unresolved problems with this logic, as well as problems with extensions of the logic as found in e.g. [HSD + 05, He05]. The identified problems imply strong restrictions on the scope of PCL, and imply that many currently claimed PCL proofs cannot be proven within the logic, or make use of unsound axioms. Where possible, we propose solutions for these problems.
Introduction
Formally establishing properties of security protocols has been investigated extensively during the last twenty years, but a definite model and a corresponding method for security protocol analysis has remained elusive thus far.
The most successful approaches to security protocol analysis have been focused on tools for finding attacks, which are often based on bounded model-checking or constraint solving, e.g. [Low97a, ABB
+ 05]. When such tools find an attack, one can easily verify manually whether or not the attack actually exists on the protocol. Some tools even allow for unbounded verification of protocols, e.g. [Bla01, Cre06] . If no attack is found with such tools, correctness of the protocol follows. However, this provides little insight into why a protocol is correct.
An alternative approach is to develop a logic for reasoning about security protocols. When a protocol is proven correct in such a logic, the derivation steps can provide insight into the mechanisms that make the protocol work. Despite the obvious promise of such an approach, several attempts have failed, most notably the BAN logic from [BAN90] . One of the stumbling points seems to be to provide a logic which is sound with respect to the complicated semantics of security protocol execution in the presence of an active intruder, and which is able to provide concise formal proofs.
A recent attempt to develop such a logic is the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) from [DDMR07] . This logic has evolved from a protocol model to express protocol composition and refinement, into a model with an associated logic that can be used to formally prove security properties of protocols [DDMP05, Dat05, Der06] . Variants of PCL have been applied to many case studies and current PCL offers several interesting features. For example, one can reason about security protocols without explicitly reasoning about the (complex) intruder by means of a special kind of invariant reasoning captured by the honesty rule. This kind of reasoning also allows the protocol logic to deal with protocol composition and refinement, where proofs can be reused. PCL The purpose of this section is to recall some PCL notions that are required to interpret the forthcoming sections. We use the syntax from [DDMR07] . This partial summary of PCL is incomplete, and we encourage the reader to use the original papers for reference.
The structure of PCL is as follows: first notation is introduced to define terms, which in turn are used to define protocols. For such protocols, an execution model is defined, assigning to each protocol a set of possible execution histories, called runs. Then, a protocol logic is defined in order to reason about (sets of) runs of a protocol. This logic is proven sound with respect to the execution model. This means that if one proves a property in terms of the protocol logic, such as Receive(. . . , m), then a similar property should hold for the corresponding set of runs in the execution model, such as "receive . . . , m has occurred in the protocol run". We touch upon these elements below.
Terms. A term system is introduced which contains constants (nonces, names, keys, etc.), variables, and compound terms such as tuples, encryptions, and signatures.
Protocols. In PCL, a protocol Q is defined as a set of roles. Each role ρ ∈ Q is defined as a list of actions. Examples of possible actions can be found in the actions column of Table 1 , and correspond respectively to sending terms, receiving terms, generating fresh terms, encryption, decryption, and signature verification. Each role is partitioned into a set of basic sequences. A basic sequence BS i of a role ρ is a contiguous subsequence of ρ that starts with either the first action of ρ or a receive action, and of which the other actions are not receive actions. The basic sequences intuitively represent the idea that agents only block at receive actions, and execute all other actions immediately, allowing one to regard basic sequences as atomic actions in some respects. The notion of basic sequences therefore roughly corresponds to the notion of step-compression in other models, e.g. [BMV03] . The basic sequences of a protocol are defined as the union of the basic sequences of each of its roles, and hence each action of a role of a protocol occurs in exactly one of its basic sequences.
Observe that although some versions of PCL have two distinct actions receive (for reading a term from the network without parsing) and match (for parsing a term and blocking if it is not as expected), these two actions are in many proofs collapsed together into a single receive action that receives and matches terms at the same time.
Execution model. An execution model is defined for protocols (in terms of cords). Actions are executed by agents, with names likeX,Ŷ . A subset of these agents, defined as HONEST(C) (where C is the initial configuration of the system), are called the honest agents, and execute their protocol roles as expected. The agents may execute each protocol role any number of times; each such instance of a role is called a thread (in other formalisms, this notion is known as a strand, or a process, or a run). Threads are usually denoted by symbols such as X, Y, Z: a sequence of actions P executed within a thread X is written as [P ] X . The notationX is often 1 used to denote the agent executing the thread X. Informally, if the agentX is honest, [P ] X is a sequence of actions from a protocol role. The agents that are not part of HONEST(C) can execute so-called intruder roles, in line with the common Dolev-Yao intruder model. In the context of this execution model, the protocol description Q gives rise to a set of runs denoted by Runs(Q). A run is typically denoted by R, and corresponds to a sequence of actions as executed by threads. A run represents a possible execution history of the system.
Protocol logic. For each of the actions that can occur in a run, a corresponding action predicate is defined. Some examples are given in the right column of Table 1 . The protocol logic is extended with logical connectives, a predicate to reason about the ordering of actions in a run (<), as well as predicates to reason about the knowledge of threads.
One of the predicates of the logic is the Honest predicate, which is closely related to the set HONEST(C). For a run R, Honest(X) is used to denote thatX ∈ HONEST(C) and "all threads ofX are in a 'pausing' state in R" [DDMR07, page 325] . This is a technicality 2 that is needed to make the honesty rule (which is not described here) work.
One predicate of interest for this paper is the Contains predicate, which is used to reason about the relation between two terms. In particular, Contains(t 1 , t 2 ) is defined by means of the subterm relation ⊆ in [DDMR07, page 323], stating that t 1 contains t 2 as a subterm. The subterm relation ⊆ is never formally defined. Here we assume that the subterm relation is defined syntactically 3 . In particular, we assume that a signature such as SIGX {| m | } contains m, 1 The hat notationˆis used in at least two different interpretations in both [DDMP05] and [DDMR07] . In some cases X is used to denote a particular thread, andX is then interpreted as the agent that executes that thread, as e.g. can be seen in the usage of Y in the SEC axiom [DDMR07, page 327], replicated here on page 5. Thus, in one interpretationˆcan be regarded as a function from a thread to an agent. However, in other casesX is used to denote a particular agent, and X is then interpreted as "any thread executed by the agentX", as in the honesty rule HON [DDMR07, page 329], and the VER axiom [DDMR07, pp. 329-330], replicated here on page 5. In this second interpretation, X is a variable that ranges over all threads executed by the agentX, andX effectively expresses a domain restriction on X.
2 The Honest predicate serves within the honesty rule as an encoding of the atomic nature of basic sequences.
3 Observe that if we would alternatively assume that the subterm relation involves only tuple projection, as seems to be suggested by the i.e. Contains(SIGX {| m | }, m) holds. Note that this assumption only plays a role in the construction of a particular counterexample in Section 3.3, and does not influence any of our general observations. Using the protocol logic, one aims to establish properties of all runs of a protocol. A run R of a protocol Q that satisfies a property φ is denoted as Q, R |= φ. If all runs of a protocol Q satisfy φ, we write Q |= φ.
Problems with basic PCL
In this section, we address two problems with basic PCL as defined in [DDMR07, DDMP05, Dat05, Der06] . First, we identify in Section 3.1 a strong restriction on the scope of PCL. Then, we identify two missing proof mechanisms that seem to be necessary to prove simple protocols correct in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
Authentication properties only provable for signature protocols
In the current PCL description in [DDMR07] , as well as in [DDMP05, Dat05] , the possibility of proving authentication properties is limited to protocols that use signatures.
Proving an authentication property such as aliveness or agreement requires a proof of existence of actions of another agent. In PCL, there is only one axiom that allows for a conclusion of that type. The precondition of this axiom can only be met by protocols that use signatures. As a consequence, if a protocol does not use signatures, the existence of a communication partner cannot be proven within the logic. This is surprising, as PCL was "initially designed as a logic of authentication" [DDMR07, page 313], and for the PKINIT protocol, which contains no signatures, it is claimed that "our proof The problem occurs for all authentication properties that imply the existence of a communication partner. This includes aliveness or any form of agreement from [Low97b] , matching conversations from [BR94] , or synchronisation from [CMdV06] . This last property is the authentication property used within PCL [DDMR07, page 331]. All these properties are of the form:
where typically, φ(X) denotes that thread X executes a role that authenticates another role. Such a property states that if a thread X executes actions of a certain role (e.g. all actions of an initiator role), then there exists a thread Y , which has executed some actions of another role then e.g. the P2 and VER axioms in [DDMP05, DDMR07] are unsound, because respectively the fresh value and the signature might be sent as part of an encrypted term, and decrypted by an agent that knows the key.
(e.g. the first two actions of a responder role), and possibly some further condition holds. This is captured in ψ(Y ). Note that both the weak and strong authentication properties in the example of [DDMR07, page 331] belong to this class of authentication properties. In order to prove such a property, it is required to prove the existence of a thread. Examination of all axioms of the logic reveals that only one axiom allows for the conclusion of the existence of a thread, which is the VER axiom [DDMR07, page 327]:
Because this axiom has the signature verification predicate Verify in the precondition, it can only be used for signature protocols. Hence there is no way to prove the existence of another thread for protocols without signatures.
Other comments regarding non-signature protocols. Whilst introducing new axioms for establishing thread existence for non-signature protocols is non-trivial, there is a related problem with the inconsistent use of symmetric/asymmetric cryptography. In current PCL, there is only one type of encryption operator, and only a single key set, in the sense that the rules for encryption and decryption do not distinguish between different types of keys. This suggests that either only symmetric, or only asymmetric encryption is supported. The current definitions of the reaction rules [DDMR07, page 318], the action formulas [DDMR07, page 324] and the Has predicate [DDMR07, pp.324-325] all indicate that one encrypts and decrypts a message using the same key, e.g.:
The same assumption, that one encrypts and decrypts with the same key, can be found in axiom AR3 [DDMR07, page 327]. Without explaining the full details of the notation of this axiom, we want to point out that the key K is used as the key to decrypt a message encrypted with K:
However, the idea that symmetric encryption is intended seems to be contradicted by the SEC axiom [DDMR07, page 327], which states that there is only one agent that can decrypt a message encrypted with a key, along the lines of asymmetric encryption:
Combined with the definition of the Has predicate, one is lead to conclude that the only one who can create the encrypted message that occurs in the SEC axiom, is the agent that can decrypt it.
Implications
In order to prove any authentication property of the form of (1) for a protocol that does not use signatures, one needs to introduce consistent machinery for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, and several new axioms, of which soundness has to be proven. In current basic PCL, protocols like Needham-Schroeder-Lowe 4 and many key establishment protocols cannot be modeled, and even if they could be, no authentication proofs could be given for them.
The list of applications in [DDMR07, page 345] lists "the first concise formal logic proof of secrecy and authentication for Kerberos and PKINIT". The referred version of PKINIT in [RDD + 06] is based on public-key cryptography, and no additional axioms are introduced. Therefore, given the problems described here, a complete proof of this protocol in current PCL appears impossible.
Resolving the problem
The problem can be split into three subparts. First, symmetric and asymmetric cryptography must be dealt with consistently. Second, PCL must be extended with axioms that enable proving authentication properties (existence of a thread) for symmetric cryptography. Third, resolving the problem for public-key encryption protocols (which includes many key agreement protocols, and the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol) requires the introduction of significant amounts of additional theory. We first address the two easier problems before turning to publickey encryption.
Handling symmetric and asymmetric cryptography consistently. The first requirement for resolving this problem is to split symmetric and asymmetric encryption either by having two types of encrypt/decrypt actions as in e.g. [ABB + 05], or by splitting the key set as in e.g. [Cre06] . Either choice impacts the action sets, the action formulas, the Has predicate, and requires the addition of further ARx axioms and an alternative for the SEC axiom. Most of the additions are trivial, but introduce additional complexity into the logic and possibly also the execution model.
Proving authentication for protocols using symmetric encryption or keyed hashes. The current axiom for signature protocols deals with the simplest possible case of authentication by cryptography: the signature of an honest agent can be used immediately to conclude that there exists a thread executed by this agent. If that agent differs from any agent executing the currently known threads, this implies the existence of another thread. This conclusion is based on the fact that only one agent has the private key needed to perform the signature.
For symmetric encryption and keyed hashes there is usually a notion of symmetry: in most cases, two agents share a symmetric key. Thus, if a symmetric key K shared by two honest agentŝ X andŶ , occurs in a message of a thread X, there are two candidates for the agent who created the message. If we can exclude that the message was generated in thread X executed byX, we can derive the existence of another thread Y that must have created it.
The authors of PCL have explored a variant of this route for e.g. the extensions needed for the keyed-hash based protocols in [HSD + 05]. We discuss the merits of those extensions in detail in Section 4.2.
Proving authentication for public-key encryption protocols. If we assume that PCL is extended in order to consistently deal with public-key encryption, the authentication properties still cannot be proven, as we lack an axiom for establishing thread existence as pointed out previously. Contrary to signatures or symmetric-key cryptography, there is no easy solution with an axiom based on honest agents only, because the public keys are also known to the intruder. If a message encrypted with the public key of an honest agentX occurs, no conclusion can be drawn about the sender or creator of the message. Thus we must also consider the possibility that the message was sent by the adversary.
A first step towards a solution would be to introduce an axiom in the protocol logic, along the lines of Lemma 2.3 [DDMR07, page 321] of the execution model. In fact, such an axiom was present in a precursor of PCL. In [DMP03, page 701] one can find axiom AR1 which, when recast in the current PCL model, would read
(This axiom is not in current PCL)
Unfortunately, this requires either further machinery to prove that Z is executed by an honest agent, or explicit reasoning about the intruder, as the sender thread Z need not be executed by an honest agent. This type of reasoning is not supported by current versions of PCL, and would require a significant amount of additional machinery. It would also require dropping one of the attractions of PCL, which is that no reasoning about the intruder is required.
No means to establish preceding actions in a thread
By the definition of the PCL execution model, threads of honest agents start at the beginning of a role description, and always execute the actions in the order given by the role. Thus, if one can establish that a thread of an honest agent has executed the nth action of a role, it should also be possible to conclude a similar result about preceding actions within the logic: in particular, one should be able to conclude that the preceding n − 1 actions have also occurred in the same thread. However, there is currently no mechanism in the PCL logic to draw such a conclusion.
Note that currently one can use the honesty rule to prove from, e.g., a send action that a receive action must have occurred previously, but only if both actions occur within the same basic sequence. However, if one wants to prove that given a basic sequence, an action has occurred from another basic sequence, there are no rules to enable this type of reasoning.
Implications
The consequence of not having a means of establishing preceding actions is that some claimed proofs do not seem to be correct. For example, observe the initiator role of the Q CR protocol [DDMR07, page 315]. In order to prove invariants for the protocol using the honesty rule, one has to prove that the invariants hold for all basic sequences of the protocol. The initiator role consists of two basic sequences BS 1 and BS 2 [DDMR07, page 335]: In this protocol, the basic sequence BS 1 defines m as a generated value, which fixes the semantics of m in BS 2 . Observe that there is no way to tell if m was received or generated from just investigating BS 2 .
In order to show how this makes certain proofs impossible in PCL, consider a protocol Q ′ , that contains a role ρ consisting of the basic sequences BS ′ 1 followed by BS 2 , where BS ′ 1 is defined as:
Thus the protocol Q ′ shares the basic sequence BS 2 with Q CR , but in Q ′ , m is a received valued as opposed to a generated value. Now, in order to prove invariant γ 1 [DDMR07, page 334] for basic sequence BS 2 , we must prove that m is either generated, or received earlier as the main message, by the same thread that sends out the signature:
In order to prove this invariant with respect to basic sequence BS 2 , one needs to prove that m is generated in the thread Y . However, there is no mechanism to reason about any preceding actions, and thus it has to be dealt with in the same way for both protocols Q CR and Q ′ . One must therefore also consider the case m was first received, and not generated, in a previous basic sequence as part of a bigger term, as happens in Q ′ . In fact, the invariant is false for protocol Q ′ . Thus, in order to prove the invariant for Q CR , we must be able to distinguish between the different semantics of BS 2 within the context of Q CR and Q ′ . Such reasoning is not supported by PCL at the moment.
Without the ability to reason about preceding actions, the protocol descriptions are effectively cut up into independent basic sequences, which can then only be dealt with as separate protocols. This is evident from the formulation of the honesty rule [DDMR07, page 329], in which the reference to the protocol Q is only used for the definition of the basic sequences. Thus one is required to create much stronger proofs than would be strictly necessary. Put differently, in PCL one currently has to reason with an over approximation of protocol execution, in which basic sequences occur in no fixed order in a thread.
This phenomenon can also be observed in the following example. Let P be a protocol, and let P 1 be the protocol defined as P extended with a role consisting of the basic sequences BS; BS ′ ; BS ′′ . Similarly, let P 2 be defined as P extended with a role BS ′′ ; BS ′ ; BS, i.e., a role with the same basic sequences as the role in P 1 , but composed in a different order. Then, any invariant γ that can be proven for protocol P 1 using the honesty rule, must also hold for P 2 . In fact, the proof is identical. Conversely, any invariant that holds for P 1 but not for P 2 , cannot be proven using the honesty rule. This puts a strong restriction on the type of invariants provable in PCL, because the structure (and hence the properties) of both protocols can be very different.
Ultimately, this problem seems to be a side effect of the weak link between the protocol description Q and the actions of honest agents in a run R ∈ Runs(Q) in the protocol logic. In current PCL, the only way to make the link between a protocol description and the actions of honest agents, is by means of defining an invariant and then proving it with the honesty rule. This can be seen from inspecting the protocol logic rules: the only occurrence of a protocol name (e.g. Q) is in the honesty rule. As the honesty rule only reasons about isolated basic sequences of the protocol, the relations among the basic sequences of the protocol are inevitably lost.
Resolving the problem
It should be possible to extend PCL with a "precedence" inference rule, that would allow one to infer that given the n-th action of a role ρ occurs in a thread X, also the (n − 1)-th action of the same role must have previously occurred in the same thread. Such an inference rule would allow for establishing preceding actions that must have occurred from the existence of other actions. This is particularly useful for proving invariants for basic sequences.
In general one could extend PCL with additional mechanisms to enable reasoning about the relation between protocol descriptions and the actions of honest agents in a run. However, the current weak link between the two has one major advantage: it eases compositional proofs. For example, because no constraints are put on any other (i.e. non-protocol) actions of honest agents, the sequential composition of protocols allows for re-use of proofs of invariants for basic sequences. Thus, one must be careful when introducing such links and introduce only links between the protocol and the actions of honest agent, such that the links are invariant under e.g. sequential composition. A "precedence" inference rule of the type sketched above should meet this condition.
No formal type system
It is mentioned that in PCL, "We assume enough typing to distinguish the keys K from the principalsÂ, the nonces n and so on." [DDMR07, page 316]. However, there are no constructs in PCL that allow for formal reasoning about the type of variables.
As a consequence, some claimed proofs of invariants are not correct within the logic, as they are only true under type assumptions, that cannot be expressed in PCL.
Implications
Many protocols have properties in a typed model, that do not hold for an untyped model. In particular, some protocols are correct in a typed model, but are vulnerable to so-called type flaw attacks in an untyped model. Such attacks exploit for example that an agent could mistake an encrypted session key for an encrypted nonce, and sends the key unencrypted in a next step, revealing it to the intruder. It is therefore often easier to prove properties for the typed model, but this requires that the logic supports drawing conclusions based on types. Currently, this is not possible in PCL.
As an example, observe the invariant γ 1 from [DDMR07, page 334] (reproduced in this paper on page 7). This invariant states that if a thread (of an honest agent) sends a message that contains a signature term S, with a subterm m, then either BS 3 ≡ [receiveX,Ŷ , x; new n; r := sign (n, x,X),Ŷ ; sendŶ ,X, n, r; ] Y This basic sequence corresponds to the responder receiving an unknown value, supposedly a nonce, and sending back a signed version that includes a freshly generated nonce.
Let Y ′ be a thread. If we take x = SIGŶ {| y, m,X | }, where m is generated by thread Y ′ executed by agentŶ , the invariant is violated: we have that
and by substitution in BS 3 and the Contains predicate, we find that
As a result, the message sent at the end of BS 3 of a thread Y (Y ′ = Y ) will contain m. However, m is neither generated by this thread nor is it the exact term that was received. Thus the invariant γ 1 does not hold for basic sequence BS 3 . Hence the example authentication proof of the CR protocol in [DDMR07] is incorrect.
Resolving the problem
The model can be extended with typing information for the variables, and an axiom could be introduced that captures the fact that variables are only instantiated by their typing information. This would not introduce much new machinery, but requires additional reasoning steps in most of the proofs.
Problems with PCL extensions
In this Section we discuss two extensions to PCL, in particular the extension for Diffie-Hellman exponentials and the extension for hash functions.
Diffie-Hellman exponentials
In the body of [DDMP05] as well as the appendix of [DDMR07] , basic PCL is extended with axioms for reasoning about Diffie-Hellman (DH) exponentials. To that end, the logic is extended with four additional axioms and some changes are made to the language and execution model.
Capturing Diffie-Hellman behaviour
Below we recall the three elements of the DH extension (execution model, logic, proof system) and discuss their implications. h(a, b) , representing respectively g a mod p and g ab mod p. This extension is not sound with respect to the actual algebraic properties of the exponential. For Diffie-Hellman, the crucial property is that g ab = g ba . This equation must be included in the execution model: if it is not, the following sequence of actions (denoted by their action predicates), which is perfectly valid DH-type behaviour, does not correspond to a valid execution in PCL:
Just extending the Has predicate in the logic is not sufficient, as the equivalence still has no counterpart in the execution model of PCL.
DH extension of the protocol logic. In basic PCL, the Fresh(X, x) predicate holds for any x generated by thread X (captured by Gen(X, x)), as long as x is not sent as part of another term. The protocol logic is extended with an additional rule for the Fresh predicate, stating that Fresh(X, g(x)) is true if and only if Fresh(X, x) is true, and Has is extended in [DDMR07, page 354] by
This rule is intended to capture the Diffie-Hellman equivalence relation. It is not sufficient, even with the addition of further axioms, as we show below.
DH extension of the proof system. The proof system is extended in [DDMR07, page 354, Table A .1] by a definition and four new axioms. We reproduce them here:
Define Computes (DH)
This definition captures the intuition that a thread can compute the value of g ab if and only if it has the required components. Note that for a thread that just has g ab but not a or b, this predicate is false, and therefore we have that Has(X, g ab ) does not imply Computes(X, g ab ). Using this definition, the first axiom is given as:
and corresponds to the extension of the Has predicate, which can be seen by unfolding the definition of Computes. The second axiom states
This axiom captures the notion that one can only possess such a term g ab by computing it from its parts, or receiving it. Effectively this restricts any agent (including the intruder) from knowing a term of the form g ab at the start of each run, but it also excludes that g ab is used as a parameter for a protocol.
For completeness, we also give the remaining DH axioms
which capture the assumption that g ab must have been either computed or received (but was not given as a parameter). The fourth axiom echoes the extension of the Fresh predicate.
Summarizing, even with the extension of the Has predicate and the additional axioms, the behaviour of the equivalence for Diffie-Hellman is not captured in PCL, for two reasons. First, with respect to the execution model, the sequence of actions represented by Formula (5) cannot be enabled in the execution model by just changing the protocol logic. Second, we observe that given Has (X, h(a, b) ), the protocol logic does not allow us to conclude that Has(X, h(b, a)) as one would expect (in particular in the case where ¬Computes (X, h(a, b) )). Hence, the essential equivalence for any Diffie-Hellman type protocol is currently not captured in the execution model, nor in the protocol logic.
Implications
The Diffie-Hellman extension does not correctly capture the algebraic properties of Diffie-Hellman exponentials. As a result, certain possible behaviours of DH-like protocols are not considered within the logic and its execution model. The extension is therefore unsound.
Resolving the problem
The essential feature to be captured is the equality g ab = g ba . If this is introduced at the term level, e.g. by having the equality h(a, b) = h(b, a) in the term system, this solves at the same time the problem in the execution model, protocol logic and proof system. Some further modifications to the axioms are required, and the current proofs have to be modified to take the term equality into account.
Keyed hashes
In [HSD + 05] and [He05] PCL is extended and used on a case study of protocols that do not rely solely on signatures. As observed previously, such an application requires additional axioms. In particular, to prove authentication, we need to introduce an axiom that allows us to conclude the existence of a thread.
The appendix of [HSD + 05] gives such additional axioms and definitions for keyed hash functions: one definition and four hashing axioms. We reproduce them here for convenience. We use the following convention: the named definitions are copied from [HSD + 05], whereas the unnamed (but numbered) equations are ours.
Define Computes (HASH)
Computes(X, HASH K (a)) ≡ Has(X, K) ∧ Has(X, a)
As we will see in the following, the intention of this predicate seems to be to express which thread computed the hashed value from its components. However, this intuition is not correctly captured by the definition: a typical use pattern of a keyed hash would be to provide an integrity check for a message m, as inX
where K is a key shared betweenX andŶ . In the typical use pattern, the HASH K (m) is received by an agent which at that point can construct the message m himself. In this use case, the message hash is received with (or after) the message, and is then used to verify the integrity of the message. Assume we have that m (or some subterm of it) is freshly generated by X, and we have that Computes(X, HASH K (m)) holds. However, we can also prove that once a thread Y of the recipientŶ receives the message, Y not only has K, but also m. Thus the predicate Computes(Y, HASH K (m)) holds as well. Put differently, we have that for a typical use case, Computes(. . .) holds for both the thread who creates as well as the thread who receives. In particular, this is also true for the protocols under consideration in [HSD + 05]. The protocols in the paper assume typing information (no hash mistaken for a nonce) and receive the hashed values at a point where they know the hash components.
Let K be a key shared betweenX andŶ . Then, we can prove 5 the following property (invariant) for the protocols in [HSD + 05]:
Intuitively one can see that an honest agent either creates the hash by having the components, or receives it. In this last case, where an honest agent receives the hash, the message integrity is verified using the hash, which is possible only because the recipient also has both the key K and the message m. We will use this result in our discussion of the HASH4 axiom later on. The first axiom in [HSD + 05] to use the definition of Computes() is the following:
If we unfold the definition of Computes in this axiom, it reduces to φ ⊃ φ. The second hash axiom states the following:
This axiom informally states that whoever computes the hash value also has it. If we again unfold the definition of Computes, we can see that this works as an extension of the closure properties of the Has predicate (as defined in [DDMR07] ). Effectively, it introduces a new term structure f x (y) to the PCL syntax, and expresses the one-way property of the hash function. The third hash function axiom is
This axiom is not sound. Consider the following protocol in Alice and Bob style notation, where m is a freshly generated nonce of the initiator, and K ′ is a symmetrical key shared by the initiator and responder:
In a normal run of this protocol, the initiator sends the hash as part of a bigger term, but does not send m. Thus the responder cannot compute the hash itself, but simply decrypts it, and sends it back. Thus, the preconditions are fulfilled by an initiator thread of this protocol, but the postcondition does not hold: only the initiator thread can compute it, but it does not send it out in the required form. (Observe that contrary to the protocols in [HSD + 05], this protocol does not satisfy the typical usage pattern, and therefore Formula (6) does not hold here.)
The fourth axiom is
This axiom seems to express: if someone has the hash value, she computed the hash herself, or somebody computed it and sent it (possibly as a subterm). With a suitable restriction on the intruder knowledge (the intruder should not know some HASH K (x) initially without knowing the components) this axiom can be proven sound. However, there is a problem with the applications of the axiom in the proofs of [DDMR07] . Each time this axiom is applied in proofs in the paper, one assumes honesty ofX andŶ , and that K is the key shared between them. Thus we can rewrite the application of axiom HASH4 using Formula (6), as in the following. First we unfold the definition of the axiom (7) where Φ denotes the right-hand disjunct of the axiom HASH4, starting from the existential quantifier. Now we use Formula (6) to get
In other words, ifX is assumed to be honest when applying axiom HASH4, the left-hand disjunct of the conclusion is always true (rendering the right-hand disjunct inconsequential). Because the right-hand disjunct of the conclusion contains the required thread existence, but is rendered useless, the axiom cannot be used here for proving authentication properties, based on our observations in Section 3.1.
Implications
The authentication proofs of the four-way handshake and group key handshake protocols in [HSD + 05, He05] are not correct in their current form. The reason for this is that these protocols do not contain signatures, and based on the observations in Section 3.1, any authentication proofs for such protocols require the introduction of new axioms. In this case, the only candidates are are the axioms HASH3 and HASH4. As shown above, HASH3 is not sound, and for the protocols in [HSD + 05, He05], HASH4 cannot be used to prove the existence of a thread. Hence the authentication proofs of the handshakes are incorrect, and therefore also the compositional proof of authentication of IEEE 802.11i is incorrect.
Resolving the problem
The properties of a keyed hash function like the ones occurring here are similar to the properties of symmetric-key cryptography. Thus, once sufficient reasoning infrastructure is in place for symmetric-key cryptography, one can devise a straightforward definition of a non-keyed hash function. Combining these two elements should lead to a natural definition and extension of the logic for keyed hashes.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have first shown that PCL as defined in [DDMR07, DDMP05, Dat05, Der06] cannot be used to prove authentication properties of protocols without signatures. We consider this to be a strong limitation on the scope of PCL. Next, we have pointed out two reasoning tools which are missing in PCL: reasoning about preceding actions of a role within a thread, and the lack of a formal type system. With respect to PCL extensions, we have shown that the PCL Diffie-Hellman extension does not capture the behaviour of Diffie-Hellman protocols correctly in the execution model and protocol logic. Finally, we have shown that the extension for protocols with keyed hash functions in [HSD + 05, He05] is not sound. It follows that many currently claimed PCL proofs cannot be proven within the logic, or make use of unsound axioms. This includes the proofs of authentication of the CR protocol from [DDMR07, DDMP05] , the proof of authentication of the PKINIT protocol from [RDD + 06], and the compositional proof of authentication of the IEEE 802.11i protocol from [RDD + 06]. In the papers on PCL the proofs of the invariants are often not given. This lack of proof details for the invariants is surprising, as the invariants themselves are the difficult part. Furthermore many of the proofs seem impossible to be completed in PCL without resorting to meta-reasoning. One might expect that PCL would benefit from a stricter use of the formalism.
Some of the problems identified here can be solved easily, but for some problems more work is required. For example, straightforward solutions include adding a formal type system and adding a precedence inference rule. Other problems, such as establishing thread existence for protocols based on public-key cryptography, do not seem to be solvable by straightforward fixes, and suggest that more extensive modifications to PCL are required.
